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During the 1990s, many economists, international organizations, and politicians 
promoted U.S.-style labor-market flexibility as a solution to Europe's employment 
problems. Through much of that decade, the United States did have a significantly 
higher share of its working-age population in jobs than Europe as a whole. For 
example, by 2000, when the 1990s business cycle peaked in the United States, for 
15-to-64 year olds, the employment gap between the United States and Europe was 
10.5 percentage points.
1 During the 2000s, many European policymakers have 
continued to urge U.S.-style reforms, even though the employment gap between 
the United States and Europe has narrowed considerably. By 2005, for example, the 
overall employment gap had fallen to 6.1 percentage points, reflecting both declines 




In this brief report, we focus on employment rates for the "prime-age" population 
― those in the 25-to-54 age range, who have generally completed full-time 
schooling and are still too young to retire. Among this core population, over the 
last five years, Europe has nearly closed the employment gap with respect to the 
United States. The small remaining difference is due almost entirely to low 
employment rates among women in this age range in Italy and Spain, two large 
economies with weak welfare-state institutions and long traditions of low female 
employment. 
 
John Schmitt and Dean Baker are senior economists at the Center for Economic and Policy Research. The authors 
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1  See OECD (2004, Table B). The data for the United States refer to 16-to-64 year olds. Europe here refers to the "European 
Union 15" --the first 15 member-states of the European Union. The overall employment to population rate in the United 
States was 74.1 percent; in Europe, it was 63.6 percent. 
2  See OECD (2006, Table B). The overall employment to population rate in the United States was 71.5 percent; in Europe, it 
was 65.4 percent. See footnote 1 for additional details. Old Europe Goes to Work: Rising Employment Rates in the European Union • 2 
 
We focus on the prime-age population because this age group represents the bulk of the working-
age population in both the United States and Europe.  Critics of the broad European social model,
3 
however, emphasize that welfare-state institutions have had the biggest ― if unintended ― negative 
impact on Europe's least-advantaged populations, including younger and older workers (and women 
and the less-educated). We have argued elsewhere that the employment case against the welfare state 
is not strong (see Howell, Baker, Glyn, and Schmitt, 2006, and Schmitt and Wadsworth, 2005). In 
2005, for example, in Sweden, the quintessential welfare state,  73.5 percent of 15-to-64 year olds 
were working, compared to 71.5 percent in the United States. The Netherlands (72.0 percent) and 
Denmark (75.5 percent) are two other highly regulated European economies with larger shares of 
their adult population in employment than the United States has.  
 
In this paper, we also want to emphasize that welfare-state institutions sometimes act to reduce 
employment of younger and older workers quite intentionally. Many European countries, for example, 
made explicit decisions to encourage early retirement, which had the intended effect of lowering 
employment rates for 55-to-64 year olds. In both the United States and Europe, governments have 
also worked to expand access to full-time higher education over the last 40 years. In Europe, these 
efforts have included keeping fees for post-secondary education well below those in the United 
States.  In some countries, governments also provide student stipends and other income supports 
that mean students generally don't have to work while in school. The expansion of higher education 
took place much earlier in the United States (spurred in part by draft deferrals during the Vietnam 
War for college attendees), but many countries in Europe have made up the difference in the last 
two decades.
4 Whether we agree or disagree with these policies, they presumably reflect Europeans' 
democratic choices, with electorates well aware that the impact of these decisions would be to lower 
employment. As a result, we believe that employment rates for the prime-age population are a 
reasonable test of the Europe's success in generating employment for its working-age population. 
 
We focus below on employment rates rather than unemployment rates. While the unemployment 
rate continues to be a useful indicator of economic performance, capacity, and well-being, 
economists are increasingly emphasizing the importance of the employment rate.
5 The employment 
rate has several advantages over the unemployment rate. First, the employment rate is a better 
measure of the success that economies have had in incorporating women into the paid workforce. 
Historically, many European countries had low employment rates for women, which were masked 
by simultaneously low female unemployment rates. Few women were doing paid work, fewer were 
looking for paid work, and the large majority were officially "not in the labor force." Second, the 
meaning of a reduction in the unemployment rate can be ambiguous. The unemployment rate can 
fall because workers are, on net, leaving unemployment to take jobs, or because they are, on net, 
giving up their job search and becoming "economically inactive." 
 
                                                 
3 In general, we are skeptical of the usefulness of speaking of a single "European" social model. Any term that includes 
both Sweden and Spain, or Italy and France, is so broad that it probably loses its usefulness when making comparisons 
with the United States. 
4 For a brief discussion of educational enrollment and attainment rates in OECD countries, see Schmitt and Zipperer 
(2006). 
5 The European Union's "Strategy for Growth and Employment," for example, specifies a target employment rate of 70 
percent for the European Union by 2010. Old Europe Goes to Work: Rising Employment Rates in the European Union • 3 
 
Employment Rates for Prime-age Population 
 
Table 1 displays employment rates
6 for men, women, and the total population, ages 25 to 54, in 
2000 and 2005. The first year is roughly the peak of the 1990s business cycle in the United States; 
the second year is the most recent period for which comparable data are available. The table shows 
results for four separate sets of countries: the United States; the first 15 member-countries of the 
European Union ("Europe-15");
7 the five largest economies in Europe (France, Germany,
8 Italy, 
Spain, and the United Kingdom); and three smaller, high-performing, European economies 
(Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden). 
 
TABLE 1 
Employment Rates, 25 to 54 year olds, 2000, 2005 
(percent of corresponding population) 
 
   2000     2005 
   All  Men  Women  All  Men  Women 
          
United States  81.5  89.0  74.2  79.3  86.9  72.0 
            
Europe-15 76.5  87.1  65.8  78.2  86.6  69.8 
            
France 78.3  87.1  69.6  79.6  86.6  72.7 
Germany 79.3  87.2  71.2  77.4  83.7  71.0 
Italy 68.0  84.9  50.9  72.2  86.6  57.9 
Spain 68.4  85.6  51.0  74.4  86.9  61.5 
United Kingdom  80.4  87.5  73.1  81.1  87.6  74.9 
            
Denmark 84.3  88.3  80.4  83.9  87.7  80.0 
Netherlands 81.7  92.2  70.9  81.5  88.9  74.0 
Sweden 83.8  85.8  81.7  82.9  85.0  80.8 
              
Source: OECD, Employment Outlook, 2004 and 2006, Table C.  Data for Netherlands and Sweden refer to 2004. 
 
Several aspects of the data stand out. First, Europe has made remarkable progress closing the 
employment gap over the 2000s. In 2000, the overall employment rate in the United States (81.5 
percent) was five full percentage points higher than the corresponding rate in Europe (76.5). By 
2005, the combined effect of a fall in the U.S. employment rate (to 79.3 percent) and a rise in the 
European employment rate (to 78.2) reduced the gap to just 1.1 percentage points. Europe made 
particular progress closing the employment gap for women, which fell from 8.4 percentage points in 
                                                 
6 These are employment-to-population rates ― the share of the population in the 25-to-54 age range in work. 
7 Roughly in order of accession: Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, Ireland, 
United Kingdom, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Austria, Finland, and Sweden. 
8 The data we present are for unified Germany. Since eastern Germany has much higher unemployment rates and much 
lower employment rates than western Germany and eastern Germany makes up about 20 percent of total German 
population, the unified German data give a more pessimistic evaluation of German economic performance than would 
the data for western Germany alone. Old Europe Goes to Work: Rising Employment Rates in the European Union • 4 
 
2000 to 2.2 percentage points in 2005.
9 For men, a smaller gap of 1.9 percentage points in 2000 all 
but disappeared by 2005 (0.3 percentage points).
10 
 
Second, almost all of the remaining employment gap in 2005 reflects lower employment rates for 
women in Europe. Moreover, an important part of this difference among women is due to 
particularly low employment rates for women in two large countries: Italy, where only 57.9 percent 
of prime-age women are in paid employment, and Spain, where the figure is 61.5 percent. In 2005, 
the remaining three large European economies had employment rates for prime-age women that 
were near or above those in the United States (72.0 percent): Germany (71.0 percent), France (72.7 
percent, up from 69.6 percent in 2005), and the United Kingdom (74.9 percent, up from 73.1 
percent in 2000). 
 
Third, in 2005, France had a slightly higher employment rate for prime-age workers (79.6 percent) 
than the United States did (79.3 percent). Remarkably, the higher overall employment rate in France 
was entirely due to higher employment rates among French women (72.7 percent, compared to 72.0 
percent for U.S. women). The superior French employment rate in 2005 was the product of 
declining employment rates in the United States (down 2.2 percentage points) and rising 
employment rates in France (up 1.3 percentage points). France experienced particularly strong 
increases in female employment, which rose 3.1 percentage points in five years (from 69.6 percent in 
2000 to 72.7 percent in 2005). 
 
Fourth, by far the best performers have been the three small economies in the last three rows of the 
table, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden. Compared to the United States, these three 
economies have much more established welfare-state institutions, including substantial taxation, 
generous unemployment benefits and other income supports, employment protection legislation, 
and strong unions. All three countries also have substantially stronger welfare-state features than 
Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom, and arguably stronger than France and Germany. In 2005, 
overall employment rates were higher than they were in the United States (79.3 percent) in all three 
countries: the Netherlands (81.5 percent), Denmark (83.9 percent), and Sweden (82.9 percent). The 
three small, regulated, economies did particularly well in placing women in paid employment, with 
the Netherlands (74.0 percent), Denmark (80.0 percent), and Sweden (80.8 percent) all surpassing 
the United States (72.0 percent).  
 
Finally, between 2000 and 2005, Sweden, which already had higher employment rates than the 
United States did in 2000, managed to increase employment rates sharply. Overall employment 
increased 3.9 percentage points; employment rates for men rose  4.3 percentage points, while 
employment rates for women fell about 0.9 percentage points (but remained the higher than 
anywhere else in Europe or in the United States). Spain and Italy also saw large increases in 
employment rates over the same period, though from much lower levels. Between 2000 and 2005, 
the employment rate in Italy
11 rose 4.2 percentage points to 72.2 percent in 2005; over the same 
period, the employment rate increased 4.0 percentage points in Spain. 
                                                 
9 For 2000: 74.2 (United States) - 65.8 (Europe) = 8.4; for 2005, 72.0 (United States) - 69.8 (Europe) = 2.2. 
10 For 2000: 89.0 (United States) - 87.1 (Europe) = 1.9; for 2005, 86.9 (United States) - 86.6 (Europe) = 0.3. 
11 In the intervening period, Italy changed its tax regulations, making it more difficult for workers to work off the books, 




At least two features of the data in Table 1 probably mean that the comparison overstates the 
employment performance of the United States relative to Europe. First, high incarceration rates in 
the United States bias U.S. employment rates up relative to the rates in Europe. Employment rates 
are calculated as a share of the civilian, non-institutional population. Since incarceration rates in the 
United States are five to ten times higher than they are in European countries (see Schmitt and 
Zipperer, 2006, Table 9), the exclusion of the non-institutional population from the comparison of 
employment rates has a much larger effect on the U.S. employment rates than it does on those in 
Europe. As we have demonstrated elsewhere, the effect of excluding the non-institutional 
population from estimates of the employment-to-population rate raises the overall U.S. employment 
rate for the population 16 and over by 0.9 percentage points; the effect for men, who make up about 
90 percent of the U.S. prison population, is 1.3 percentage points (see Schmitt and Baker, 2006a, 
Tables 2 and 3). 
 
Second, high and rising non-coverage rates in the underlying survey used to produce the U.S. 
employment rates may have an even bigger impact on estimates of the U.S. employment rate than 
incarceration rates (Schmitt and Baker, 2006a and 2006b).  The Current Population Survey (CPS), 
which the OECD uses to estimate employment rates in the United States for the data summarized in 
Table 1, has a high and rising non-coverage rate. As we have analyzed elsewhere, the portion of the 
U.S. population not covered by the CPS appears to have a substantially lower employment rate than 
the portion covered  by the survey. According to our estimates, problems with non-coverage biased 
upward the estimates of the employment rate for the population 16 and older in the United States in 
2000 by about 1.3 percentage points; by 2005, we estimate, the effect had risen to 1.7 percentage 
points (Schmitt and Baker, 2006b). To the extent that non-coverage rates are lower and have not 
risen as much in Europe as they have in the United States, this effect could further bias the 
comparisons in Table 1, by incorrectly boosting the relative performance of the United States.   
Conclusion 
 
For the prime-age population, the employment gap between Europe and the United States has all 
but disappeared in the last five years. The narrowing of the gap reflects falling employment rates in 
the United States in the 2000s and rising employment rates in Europe over the same period. The 
five-percentage-point gap between Europe and the United States in overall employment rates for 25-
to-54 year olds in 2000 declined to just 1.1 percentage points in 2005. The true employment gap is 
almost certainly smaller since high incarceration rates in the United States boost measured 
employment rates by excluding a large group of men from the non-institutional employment 
statistics. 
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